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## ABSTRACT

**AUTHOR:** Robert R. Grider  
**TITLE:** Is the Drug Campaign Winnable With Department of Defense Support?  
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The illegal use of drugs has been prevalent throughout history. However, today's world is one of rapidly changing political, social and economic environments. The industry of illicit drug production and trafficking grosses billions of dollars annually, often using the ill gotten wealth to undermine legitimate governments; thus destabilizing whole regions. This destabilizing of the regions is a major threat to U.S. National Security. Because of this National Security threat, President Bush in September, 1989, introduced the United States first National Drug Control Strategy and within the strategy charged the Department of Defense to be the lead agency in countering the production and trafficking of drugs. With large force reductions and the Department of Defense searching for missions to justify a larger end strength, there has been a desire to increase the military's role in the drug campaign. Is the Department of Defense organized to effectively contribute to a successful drug campaign and what are the pitfalls of Department of Defense involvement? Is the Department of Defense wasting it's time for a non-winnable cause? Major organizational restructuring will be required within the Department of Defense if there is to be a chance of successfully winning the drug campaign. If the Department of Defense does reorganize to fight the drug campaign, will the federal agencies reorganize also? The interagency conflicts, parochialism and lack of a clear center of gravity inhibit the chances for a successful drug campaign. This paper serves as an information paper for evaluation of the problems just mentioned and the conclusions reached are the author's opinion only. It is clear that the drug campaign is not being won by the United States.

**USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER**

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**IS THE DRUG CAMPAIGN WINNABLE WITH  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT?**

**AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Grider  
United States Marine Corps

Colonel William J. Flavin  
Project Advisor

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## Introduction

Today's world is one of rapidly changing political, social and economic environments. From this environment, drug trafficking and abuse have emerged as threats of greater magnitude to the United States than is commonly perceived.

A report by a congressional subcommittee headed by Nicolas Mavroules concluded, "The chief threat to our national security in the 1990's may well come from the hoards of red tomato cans filled with cocaine, rather than hoards of Red Communists."<sup>1</sup> During debate on the Senate floor in May of 1988, Senator DeConcini (D,AZ) described the drug problem as "an enemy equal to any foreign enemy."<sup>2</sup>

The industry of illicit drug production and trafficking grosses billions of dollars annually, often using it's ill gotten wealth to undermine legitimate governments; thus destabilizing whole regions. Drug abuse by American citizens translates directly into human misery and places tremendous costs on our society.

As a nation we must stem the production and flow of illicit drugs; readily assisting our friends, ever conscious of their national sovereignty and, the legitimate controls of our laws. Simultaneously, society must be convinced that illicit drug use is unacceptable behavior. In studying the issue of drugs it is important to have an understanding of the scope of the drug problem and of the different approaches used to combat the production, transport, distribution and use of illegal drugs.

The manufacturing, transporting, sale and use of drugs is a National Security issue that has failed to be halted since the first National Drug Control Strategy. Reasons are unclear as to why after two years of a supposedly integrated drug campaign, with an increased budget, little progress has been made towards solving the drug problem. Although many reasons may be given for the failure of the drug campaign, the predominant finding appears to be the lack of a complete integrated plan. There is no focus of effort/center of gravity, instead the drug plan calls for attacking the problem on a wide front. Parochialism at all levels, (strategic, operational, tactical) have forced the drug campaign to be conducted in a decentralized manner instead of a centralized manner.

This paper will address the principle reasons for the failure of a fully integrated drug campaign and examine why the policies and procedures required to combat the supply and demand of drugs are difficult to implement. Through the examination of the organizations at the Executive level, to include the Department of Defense, this paper will address how decisions and implementation of the National Drug Strategy is made at the strategic level. Department of Defense organization will be discussed to point out weaknesses that inhibit a successful campaign, specifically at the tactical and operational level. Historically, employment of military might considers the concepts of ways, means and ends of directing force upon force.

The major question that needs to be answered is this, where does the Department of Defense fit into this "War"?

### **How Serious is the Threat?**

The drugs that are the basis of the illicit drug threat are cannabis (marijuana and hashish), heroin, cocaine, diverted substances, and dangerous drugs. Over eight million Americans are regular marijuana users, over four million regularly use cocaine, and over one-half million use heroin.<sup>3</sup> Even more significant is the fact that over two thousand Americans are arrested on a daily basis, all for drug related incidents.<sup>4</sup> When highlighting these particular numbers it is important to understand that this only represents only a small portion of the American population.

Although the drug problem involves a small portion of the American population, counterdrug programs need to be viewed from an international perspective. The complexity of the international perspective is best explained within the Andean Region. Drug addiction and the demand for illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, transcends national boundaries. Often drug lords within the Andean Region attempt to establish themselves as a state within a state which poses a challenge to the legitimate government for control over the country. They try to convince the people that the war against drugs cannot be won at an acceptable cost to the country's democratic institutions. As a



result, the drug trade undermines regional stability by destroying social values. Many cocaine traffickers, as in Colombia, have impeded state sponsored reforms by winning over poor peasants, creating jobs, improving incomes and standards of living both directly and indirectly. They have built schools, recreational facilities, clinics and even churches in an effort to win over the people to their endeavor.<sup>5</sup>

### **The Economic Threat Within the Andean Region**

The major vulnerability of the Andean countries to drug trafficking is economical. The current drug boom provides employment for hundreds of thousands of peasants, and is the single most important source of foreign exchange for the regions debt burdened economy's. Colombia has declared a war on drugs, yet is turning a blind eye to the influx of drug dollars that help boost the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves.<sup>6</sup> The countries are poor, heavily in debt with governments too weak to police the problem. The peasant whose annual income is \$1,700 can now make \$5,000 profit by growing poppies on a one-tenth hectare plot of land.<sup>7</sup> For instance Peru is faced with an ironic dilemma:

**"The country's fragile economy is bolstered by the very coca industry that provides the Shining Path with its human and financial base of support.... Paradoxically, this industry is simultaneously supporting the state with desperately needed coca dollars and subverting it by fueling the insurgency. As long as there is no viable economic alternative to coca production, coca farmers will logically grow the leaf and seek protection from the**

guerrillas. Meanwhile, Peru's economic and political crisis continue to deepen. As the economy deteriorates, Peru's reliance on coca revenue increases."<sup>8</sup>

As one foreign official commented, for the United States to expect Peru to fight a drug war is like "asking a country that's fighting the Civil War and going through the Great Depression to suddenly take on Prohibition as well."<sup>9</sup>

Bolivia, which is the largest recipient of United States aid, and dependent on the good will of the United States, is an economy hooked on coca. This leverage forced upon the Bolivian government by the United States is evident in the war on drugs, where the United States has made it clear that without Bolivian support of the United States strategy against drugs, aid will not flow. Historically speaking, the Bolivian military has a notorious history of coups, corruption and direct involvement in drug trafficking. Consequently, the United States strategy for Bolivian military involvement was almost universally opposed by Bolivians; as one development worker from Cochabamba noted ironically, "to bring in the army (for drug control), would be the best way to promote drug trafficking in Bolivia." Well organized peasant coca growers federations have staged protests to show their dislike for Bolivian military involvement, and have even vowed to form self defense groups to counter any military attacks.<sup>10</sup>

Over eighty per cent of the cocaine that arrives in the United States is processed from Colombia, while thirty percent of the cocaine is grown in Peru and thirty percent in Bolivia.

Eighty five per cent of the marijuana used in the United States is provided by Mexico while the primary source of hashish comes from Southwest Asia.<sup>11</sup> When evaluating the influx of drugs from outside the United States, the international implications clearly demonstrate the need for effective counterdrug operations. Because of these implications and the future threat to the United States national security, President Bush established a National Drug Strategy.

#### **President Bush's National Drug Strategy**

On 5 September 1989, President George Bush introduced the Administration's National Drug Control Strategy. President Bush explained that illicit drugs represent the greatest threat to our national well being.<sup>12</sup>

"Too often, people in the government acted as if their part of the problem, whether fighting drug production or drug smuggling or drug demand, was the only problem. But turf battles won't win this war; teamwork will.

Tonight, I am announcing a strategy that reflects the coordinated, cooperative commitment of all federal agencies. In short, this plan is as comprehensive as the problem. With this strategy, we now finally have a plan that coordinates our resources, our programs and the people who run them.

Our weapons in this strategy are: the law and criminal justice system; our foreign policy; our treatment systems and our schools and drug prevention programs. So the basic weapons we need are the ones we already have. What's been lacking is a strategy to effectively use them."<sup>13</sup>

The strategy was a two part blueprint to combat the threat to our self preservation by diminishing the demand for drugs and

eliminating the supply. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney declared, "The detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs is a high priority of the Department of Defense."<sup>14</sup> Secretary Cheney charged the major military commands with hemispheric responsibilities to draft plans on how the Department of Defense could support the drug campaign. Department of Defense support for the President's Drug Strategy would almost entirely focus on the second facet of the strategy-- elimination of supply. Interdiction of the drug flow is the measure to which military assets are more applicable.

Based on President Bush's Drug Strategy and Defense Secretary Cheney's mandate to the major military commands, it was felt that this strategy would be the first time that the Department of Defense in conjunction with Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) at the local, state and federal level would work together in a coordinated effort to combat drugs.

The President's National Drug Control Strategy was a balanced plan, with prioritized objectives to combat the supply and demand of drugs. The focus of the drug campaign would be to use whatever resources were available within the United States to prevent illicit drug supply, distribution and demand. This focus would require pressure on every point outside the United States, increased police activities and prevention.

Since the President's first National Drug Control Strategy in 1989, how effective has the coordinated effort between the Department of Defense and law enforcement agencies been?

Recently six State Department, Pentagon, and Congressional reports have documented serious failings in United States military or paramilitary drug programs. American efforts one report says, "are plagued by poor management, policy confusion and faulty intelligence."<sup>15</sup> This confusion is causing possible lasting damage to the already unstable politics of America's Latin allies and according to the latest survey by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the same number of people used cocaine weekly last year as in 1989.<sup>16</sup>

The first National Drug Control Strategy charged the Department of Defense as the lead agency for detecting and monitoring air and maritime shipments of illegal drugs in transit to the United States. In September, 1991, a Government Accounting Office (GAO) review of this mission focused on performance in expanding and integrating national detection and monitoring capabilities, and contribution to the national goal of reducing the supply of drugs entering the United States.<sup>17</sup> The result of the GAO review concluded that the Department of Defense has in fact given a high priority to the detection and monitoring of drugs. The approach has been cooperative and pragmatic in nature and allowed for expansion in national surveillance resources. However, even with a stronger commitment of aircraft, radars and other assets, no fully integrated and monitoring operation has been implemented.<sup>18</sup> The GAO review further concluded that Department of Defenses increased detection and monitoring capabilities have had no significant impact on the

national goal of reducing drug supplies.<sup>19</sup> These findings are similar to the Newsweek article that found no decrease in drug use or supply since the first National Drug Control Strategy of 1989.

Herein lies the major weakness concerning the President's drug strategy. The strategy required that efforts for eliminating the supply and demand of drugs be applied to all areas of the drug campaign -- by attacking the drug problem in this manner the administration failed to identify a center of gravity. In providing unity among all participants involved in the drug campaign, all counterdrug programs must recognize that a center of gravity is critical for the success of reducing the supply and demand of drugs. Everything else is secondary. To date this has not been accomplished.

Again an example of how this lack of a center of gravity on the international arena is best exemplified by the Andean strategy. The objectives of the strategy were the (1) Isolation of coca-growing areas; (2) Interdiction within Andean countries of the delivery of essential chemicals required for cocaine processing; (3) Destruction of cocaine processing facilities; (4) Dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations; and (5) Eradication of the coca crop when it made effective strategy. All these objectives would receive equal emphasis. There was no center of gravity.<sup>20</sup>

Poor coordination and direction beginning at the Executive level and transcending to the tactical level, parochialism among

many agencies with similar missions, and a lack of understanding of how to win the drug campaign, continue to negate the possibility for a fully integrated drug campaign. To understand these comments, a review of how the various Federal agencies at the Executive level are organized, and how they see their role in the drug campaign needs to be explored. Through this review, and the problems associated within this level of strategic policy making, it becomes clear as to why there is a problem with establishing a center of gravity. Can the drug war be won and if so how?

### **Organisation at the Executive Level**

Before describing the organization at the Executive level, six counterdrug activities need to be described so that as the responsibilities of the different agencies who conduct the drug campaign are explained, the reader will better understand how missions and jurisdiction overlap. These six counterdrug activities include:

(1) **Investigation and Prosecution:** These actions are designed to destroy drug trafficking infrastructures by incarcerating traffickers, seizing drugs and drug-related assets, and deporting alien traffickers.

(2) **International Drug Control:** International drug control seeks to reduce the supply of drugs by helping foreign governments eradicate crops, disrupt and destroy laboratory

operations, interdict drugs close to production sources, arrest and prosecute major traffickers and seize drug-related assets.

(3) **Intelligence:** Intelligence operations are designed to produce, process and interpret information to meet requirements of the end user. The three categories of drug enforcement intelligence are strategic, tactical and operational and they are generally defined as follows: (1) strategic intelligence is information on broad patterns and trends used for making high-level policy decisions; (2) tactical intelligence is information used for specific actions often involving a near-term response such as arrest or seizure; (3) operational intelligence is information used to support the planning and execution of specific operations as well as investigations and prosecutions.

4) **Diversion and Controlled Substance Analogue Regulation:** This activity focuses on the diversion of licit drugs from legitimate commerce and distribution networks, the diversion of chemicals used in the clandestine production of licit or illicit drugs, and the control of substance analogues that are chemical variants of controlled drugs.

(5) **Interdiction and Border Control:** Interdiction and border control involves the interception and seizure of illegal drugs entering the United States or travelling through the distribution chain to a user. Interdiction includes intercepting shipments as they move from their departure points in source countries along smuggling routes to the United States land, sea and air borders and within the interiors of the country. Three



zones are associated with interdiction. They include the departure zone, the transit zone and the arrival zone.

(6) Detection and Monitoring: These activities are generally considered a part of interdiction and border control. The objectives are to detect all aerial and maritime attempts to illegally transport drugs in the country, and to monitor this traffic until it is successfully handed over to DLEAs.<sup>21</sup>

#### National Security Council (NSC)

The National Security Council is the principal forum for national security issues that require Presidential decision making. The NSC has a statutory function of advising the president on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Primarily, the NSC focuses its energy in developing policy recommendations to the President for Overseas Continental United States (OCONUS) counterdrug efforts, while the ONDCP orients counterdrug efforts stateside. Because of the major overlaps in policy coordination between the NSC and Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), representatives from the ONDCP attend many of the NSC interagency meetings. Often ONDCP or the Department of State (DOS) will chair an interagency group. Otherwise a member of the NSC staff will chair the interagency group. Within the NSC two functional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC's) have been established. One for counterterrorism (CT), and one for counternarcotics (CN). Both because of the global issues. These two committees are chaired by members of the NSC staff.

Additional groups are formed to assist the Deputies Committee. The Coordinating Subgroup for Narcotics (CSGN) has been established to support the PCC and Deputies Committee and it is within the CSGN that the majority of counterdrug policy is formed. Because of the complexity of the counternarcotics operations, the CSGN is further divided into different groups depending on the particular issue i.e., Andean Strategy, demand reduction. These groups normally range from teams of 10 to 20 people from agencies related to the issue. Once policy is agreed upon and approved by the President, departments within the Federal Government then execute the policy.

**Department of State (DOS)**

The Department of State is a key participant within the NSC interagency process. Within the DOS, the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters is the lead agency for coordinating the government's international supply-reduction strategies. The Bureau supports a broad range of drug control programs in foreign countries, focusing on such activities as crop eradication, investigations, interdictions and intelligence gathering. The Bureau works through Narcotics Assistance Units who are part of the Ambassadors Country Team.

The Ambassador who represents the President, takes policy guidance in counternarcotics matters from the Secretary of State. He is responsible for all U.S. activities within the host country. The Ambassador takes U.S. National Drug Policy and oversees the application. The Country Team assists the

Ambassador in the interpretation of the strategy and then provides operational direction within the country.

**Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

The central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responsibilities lie in the gathering and dissemination of intelligence. In 1989 the CIA established a counternarcotics Center for producing analysis on foreign intelligence acquired by national intelligence agencies. The counternarcotics center includes representatives from the United States Customs Service, United States Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the National security Agency.

**Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)**

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) replaced the old National Policy Board and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). The primary focus of ONDCP is for coordination of Federal, State and local efforts to control illegal drug supply and demand. It devises policies, objectives and priorities for the nation's antidrug activities and each year develops the National Drug Control Strategy for the President's submission to Congress. The Director of ONDCP enjoys considerable visibility as a member of the Executive Office of the President, yet has little statutory authority to ensure vigorous support for the Drug Strategy. However, the Director advises the President on the performance of Federal agencies in supporting the strategy. The Director consolidates the budgets from the various Executive departments and agencies that fall

under the ONDCP and then submits the budget to the President and Congress.

Along with the creation of the ONDCP agencies that fall under the direction and coordination of the ONDCP have been tasked with certain responsibilities in the drug campaign. Counterdrug responsibilities include international drug control, intelligence, interdiction and border control and detection and monitoring.

#### Department of Defense (DOD)

The Department of Defense has been tasked to be the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the country. In addition to its role as lead agency for detection and monitoring, DOD also plays a supporting role in international intelligence activities. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 also tasked the Department of Defense to brief State law and enforcement agencies on the type of support that the DOD can provide to the agencies. The Secretary of Defense has tasked the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to implement the DOD detection and monitoring mission. To do this , the CJCS defines and develops organizational responsibilities and operational plans. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has been designated as the Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support.

## Department of Justice

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), all fall under the control of the Department of Justice. The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the Department of Justice. It is charged with gathering and reporting facts, locating witnesses, and compiling evidence in cases involving Federal jurisdiction, including illicit drug trafficking.

The DEA is the lead Federal agency in enforcing federal narcotics and controlled substance laws and regulations. DEA is responsible within the policy guidance of the DOS and the Chiefs of U.S. missions for cooperation with counterpart agencies abroad. The DEA serves as a major player in international counternarcotics activities in cooperation with forces of host nations such as Peru and Bolivia. A major mission of DEA is the management of national narcotics intelligence systems. Therefore, DEA chairs the eleven-agency National Intelligence Consumers Center (reports on the drug production, trafficking, abuse trends), manages the El Paso Intelligence Center (strategic and tactical related drug intelligence) and may manage the soon to be established National Drug Intelligence Center. El Paso Information Center (EPIC) is a cooperative effort of eleven federal agencies. It disrupts the flow of illicit drugs at the highest trafficking areas through the collection, processing, and dissemination of information. Many state law enforcement agencies are also affiliated with EPIC.

The INS is responsible for the admission, status administration, and removal of aliens within the United States. INS detects and apprehends smugglers and illegal aliens throughout the United States. The U.S. Border Patrol is the principal enforcement component of the INS and is responsible for interdicting drug traffickers along the U.S. borders.

#### Department of Treasury

This Department manages and superintends the nations finances and associated activities through the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and the Internal revenue Service (IRS).

The USCS is the primary border enforcement agency and is responsible for controlling, regulating, and facilitating the movement of carriers, persons and commodities between the United States and other nations. The USCS shares the role of lead agency for air interdiction with the USCG, although the USCS is responsible for the interception, tracking and apprehension of drug smugglers.

The ATF is the principal organization concerned with investigation and apprehension of individuals involved with arson, manufacturing and trafficking illicit distilled spirits, trafficking in contraband cigarettes, illegal trafficking, possession and use of firearms, destructive devices, and explosives.

The IRS supports the drug intervention efforts through the mission of administering and enforcing the tax laws. It is

especially effective in tracking large sums of money to counter laundering attempts at home and abroad.

#### Department of Transportation

The Department of Transportation is the executive department concerned with the development and coordination of policies involving an efficient and economical national transportation system through the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The USCG drug enforcement mission is concerned with interdiction of maritime vessels and aircraft engaged in smuggling drugs into the United States, both in waters adjacent to principal source and transit countries, and in U.S. costal waters.

The FAA serves as the agency concerned with the use and manner of navigable air space. The FAA assists in identifying airborne drug smugglers by using radar, posting aircraft lookouts, and tracking the movements of suspect aircraft.

#### Department of Agriculture

While this organization's principal concerns are with plant and animal disease, they are also concerned with drug control activities in National Forests. The U.S. Forest Service manages national forests, grasslands, and land utilization projects in forty-four states. Many of these resources are in rural and isolated areas which have served as cultivation areas for marijuana.

#### Department of the Interior

The Department of the Interior's most important bureaus involved in counterdrug operations include the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Park Service (USPS) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).

The BLM is responsible for management of 272 million acres of Public Lands in the West and Alaska. Much of this remote and uninhabited acreage is either forest land, which is conducive for marijuana cultivation, or located on the U.S./Mexico border where smugglers bring in drugs.

The USPS manages the many park areas located near drug smuggling and trafficking routes or adjacent lands where marijuana cultivation is occurring.

The BIA has as its principal objective the training of Indian and Alaskan Native people to manage their own affairs under a trust relationship with the Federal Government, and the development of their human and natural resource potential. Many of the areas where these people are located near or in areas where smuggling or marijuana cultivation is occurring.

#### Regional Areas

There are five High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) which were established in 1988 as authorized by the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988. These five HIDTAs include the metropolitan areas of New York City, Los Angeles, Miami and Houston and the Southwest Border and adjacent areas of the border states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. Overall direction of the five HIDTAs is by a Deputy Attorney General for



the four metropolitan HIDTAs and the Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Law Enforcement for the Southwest Border HIDTA.

**Project Northstar**

An organization with Federal, State and joint agencies concerned with drug enforcement on the U.S.-Canadian border. This organization works closely with the Region 1 RLSO located in Buffalo, N.Y. to provide various types of support to DLEAs. Project Northstar is a multi-agency coordination center responsible for assisting drug law enforcement agencies throughout the sixteen U.S. Northern states and ten bordering Canadian provinces along the five thousand mile common border.

**Conflicting Missions and Responsibilities  
and the Impact on Integration**

Having just discussed the organization at the Executive level, establishment of the ONDCP, and the taskings of the agencies involved in the drug campaign, the next question that needs to be addressed is how do these agencies see their role in conducting the drug campaign? More importantly, what impact does their particular view for their role in the drug campaign have for implementation of an integrated drug strategy?

There are over thirty-five federal agencies with overlapping jurisdiction who participate in the drug campaign. Of the thirty-five agencies, there continues to be a problem of how the different agencies view their role in the drug campaign. The

problem of policy decision and jurisdiction primarily revolves around the Customs Service, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Border Patrol, and the Pentagon. Although the Department of Defense has been designated the as the lead agency in detection and monitoring of drugs and the Drug Enforcement Administration the lead agency in the overall drug campaign, no one seems to be in charge. This applies at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

One of the greatest challenges for successful integration for drug interdiction continues to be the coordination of law enforcement efforts between the many agencies involved. There is no central agency with directive authority over all agencies, hence cooperation between agencies is more voluntary than directive. A perfect example of this lack of coordination occurred in the fall of 1988 when agents from the DEA and USCS effectively arrested each other during a cocaine sting operation in Phoenix Arizona. The DEA had arranged to play the role of buyer in hopes of arresting the dealer. The USCS, meanwhile, had set up an operation as the dealer in order to arrest the buyer. Plans went awry at the site of the bust when agents from the two agencies recognized each other and realized they had set up either end of the same operation.<sup>22</sup>

The ability for the Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) to effectively coordinate and fight the drug campaign is hampered by a lack of personnel and money. The success of integration is

power, and in Washington D.C. power is spelled out in money. Because each agency is awarded money from the budget based on their success in interdiction and the amount of drugs confiscated, the individual agencies tend to be uncooperative and parochial. The more drugs seized by the agency, the more money received in the next fiscal budget. This line of thinking was explained to me while visiting JTF-6. During an operation by DEA agents, who were monitoring a drop point for cocaine, they refused to release the information to the FBI. Reason: The DEA felt that if the FBI made the arrest and confiscated the drugs not only would they receive the credit but also an increase of their budget.<sup>23</sup> This is only one incident, but looking at all agencies working in the same manner it becomes easy to understand why there is little cooperation and much duplication of effort.

One of the most fundamental tasks that the military plans to accomplish before entering combat is to "Organize for Battle". Most of the Federal agencies that I have just described have multiple responsibilities in addition to the ones associated with drugs. This leads to a fragmentation of mission execution and a duplication of responsibilities. For instance, both the DEA and the FBI are jointly responsible for the enforcement of the Controlled Substance Act. The overlapping responsibilities and competition for resources (money), result in confusion for all DLEAs. The issue of competition once again raises the question for the military: Which agency receives priority for assistance?

Federal interdiction efforts are not planned, controlled or

divided by any single department or agency, instead the interdiction efforts are split among three Executive departments (Justice, Treasury and Transportation), each with different goals and priorities. DEA has the overall responsibility for drug enforcement, USCS has been designated the lead agency for the interdiction of smugglers at the border, and the USCG has been designated the lead agency for the interdiction of drugs on the high seas. In many cases these independent programs address separate elements of the same threat. The same organization that smuggles drugs may also be involved in money laundering. Although the above three agencies are all involved in drug interdiction, they have differing goals, i.e., the USCG and USCS seek the seizure of drugs, while the DEA seeks to immobilize trafficking organizations. Because drug interdiction responsibilities are split among three Federal agencies in three different departments, effective management of the resources devoted to interdiction is complicated. The budgets of the three agencies are developed in separate departments and reviewed by different OMB branches. Although ONDCP certifies the adequacy of the drug budget, the Federal agencies maintain tight control over the money. Until Congress passes more power to ONDCP for control of the drug budget, little will change. With three different Executive agencies, each having different goals, this impacts on resource management and strategy/policy decisions. Again this raises the question of who does the military support for interdiction efforts? Seizure of drugs equates to added funding

for individual agencies and added funding implies less cooperation among the agencies.

### Intelligence Operations

Besides the parochialism that infests the bureaucracy and diminishes the capability to conduct an effective drug campaign, examination of how the intelligence network functions also highlights the need for a better sharing of information. Effective drug enforcement depends on the timely and accurate exchange of information between agencies. Currently, 24 civilian intelligence agencies and 9 Department of Defense components operate over 100 drug control information systems.<sup>24</sup>

In May of 1991 a Government Accounting Report highlighted five serious flaws within the intelligence area that need to be improved. The five problem areas include: (1) The need for leadership to commit resources to improve the use and sharing of drug related information. Currently, each agency determines their individual funding and a disjointed agency-by-agency approach to counterdrug intelligence efforts hinder needed improvement. (2) Incompatibility among the different systems pose interoperability problems equating to the inability to exchange information. The lack of interoperability between DEA systems and other agencies has delayed the exchange of time-critical information. (3) The sharing of inaccurate and unreliable information misdirects interdiction efforts. An example includes design deficiencies in the USCS system for detecting and tracking smugglers. This has caused the system to

associate flight plans with wrong aircraft and share the wrong information with law enforcement agencies. (4) Protection of sensitive data concerning people, investigations and national security. The Department of Justice has failed to protect information about informants and undercover agents. (5) Proliferation of intelligence centers decreases effective management of information.<sup>25</sup>

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), is a task force operation that has been created to collect and share tactical intelligence relating to drugs, aliens and/or weapons smuggling among it's participating agencies. In the President's National Drug Control Strategy, EPIC is recognized as the nation's principal tactical drug intelligence processing and analysis facility. Representation in EPIC includes fourteen federal agencies with the Special Agent in Charge always being a representative from the DEA. The Assistant Special Agent in Charge rotates among members from the Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Customs Service and the Coast Guard.<sup>26</sup>

Again there has been established a task organized agency that has the capabilities to be a major contributor in the drug campaign. EPIC can provide real time intelligence for counter narcotics operations, however, there is the problem of parochialism. While interviewing one of the representatives at EPIC he provided comments that indicated there was a problem with the dissemination of intelligence information. There is a consistent problem within the various agencies of sharing

intelligence information. State and local law enforcement agencies have named EPIC "The Black Hole" because although tremendous amounts of information is gathered and stored at EPIC, very little is disseminated.<sup>27</sup> If a particular agency, other than the agency that initially provided the information wants the originator information, they must request the information through formal channels. The information will only be given out if the originator is willing to do so.

#### **Summary of Overall Intelligence Effectiveness**

Despite recognition as to the importance of intelligence in the drug campaign, interdiction forces will continue to face a shortage of real or near time information. Almost all agencies involved in counterdrug efforts maintain the mission of intelligence gathering. Systems are in place to provide strategic and tactical intelligence, but nothing for the operational level. Tactical intelligence is best defined as low-level intelligence with near real time information needed by DLEAs to interdict and apprehend personnel engaged in illegal drug activities i.e., aircraft side numbers, vehicle flight profile etc. Strategic intelligence is defined as intelligence that predicts future narco-trafficking trends and provides a picture of the entire threat environment.

The limitation placed on DLEAs for intelligence information needs to be reevaluated. For instance, DOD personnel can't send

classified information to DLEAs unless they meet certain clearance requirements. Or a DOD asset receives unclassified information, but once the information is fused with DOD intelligence, the information becomes unavailable because of an upgrade in the classification. The CIA has certain statutory limitations that restrict the sharing of information. EPIC's collection of various types of computer systems which are not interoperable require the accessing of information through single-function terminals. This forces analysts to move from one computer to another to complete investigations. The end result is that agencies trying to obtain information from EPIC find the process time-consuming and not always responsive to their needs.

### **Analysis and Conclusions**

Reforming the federal bureaucracy may be the most difficult job in the government. The Anti-Drug Act of 1988 instructed the administration to undertake the effort of reforming the federal agencies. They were to submit by January 15, 1990 a comprehensive plan to improve the coordination and efficiency among federal drug agencies. One of the requirements was to reduce the number of antidrug agencies by consolidating under a single head agencies with similar functions. Unfortunately, the opposite approach was taken. Despite instances of clear duplication among the thirty-five agencies, the administration did not recommend any major consolidation. Instead, the White



House strategy proposed to improve the coordination and efficiency of the drug campaign by establishing up to a dozen working groups, task forces and coordinating committees.

In the area of intelligence availability EPIC is not being utilized to the fullest capabilities. There must be the ability to provide more accurate, timely and comprehensive drug-related intelligence to support field operations. State and local law enforcement agencies must have controlled access to federal drug intelligence. All intelligence assets must eventually be consolidated and co-located in the new National Intelligence Center. Only when this is accomplished will this allow for long-term strategy and policy development in the drug campaign.

#### **Department of Defense Organization**

To understand the role of the Department of Defense in the drug campaign, an explanation of how the Department of Defense is organized to fight the drug campaign needs to be understood by the reader. This portion of the paper will describe the Department of Defense organization from the Office of the Secretary of Defense down to the six major military commands. This review will focus on the six major commands, how they are organized and their areas of responsibility. Within certain major military commands, there are JTF's assigned to help DLEAs integrate DOD resources that have been requested by that particular DLEA. Examination of the problems experienced by the

JTF's in support of the DLEAs will also be evaluated.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

As was previously stated, in September 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney directed that the Department of Defense would become the lead agency in the detection and monitoring of illegal drugs. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is the coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and support. Although the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs is the coordinator for the Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, he has minimal say in development of counterdrug strategy. The Deputy Secretary of Defense for policy, along with the National Security Council, Department of State and Joint Chiefs of Staff to name a few, establish the strategic counterdrug policy for the United States. The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for National Security policy with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) and Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) working under him. ISA and SOLIC are responsible for coordination of military support to third world countries. Once the strategic direction is decided upon, the various CINC's and various JTF's execute the policy at the operational level.

Because the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs falls out of the policy decision chain, he must always go to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy to coordinate counterdrug policy guidance. This in turn creates additional

coordination requirements. By virtue of this organization, the implementation and integration of counterdrug policy is less efficient. This is a bureaucratic nightmare that results in a vague counterdrug policy which is misdirected and without a center of gravity when it leaves OSD.

A major problem for the establishment of a coordinated effort between the Department of Defense and DLEAs is a result of the current Department of Defense organization. Currently, Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) falls within the control of Forces Command (FORSCOM); JTF-4 falls within the control of U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM); and JTF-5 falls within the control of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). U.S. Southern Command (SOCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are not assigned and JTF's.

#### Forces Command (FORSCOM)

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Forces Command, located in Atlanta Georgia, is the key Department of Defense headquarters within the Continental United States (CONUS). Counterdrug responsibilities of FORSCOM are

spread across five general areas of support to include: operational support; intelligence support; training support; planning support; and demand reduction. FORSCOM assists the military, civilian and foreign agencies including the four other CINC's and Federal, State and local DLEA's (to include National Guard units under State control).

Also under the control of FORSCOM is Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) located in El Paso, Texas. JTF-6 acts as the middle man for support of the DLEAs who request military support.

The Department of Defense created the JTF's to coordinate the operational level of the Department of Defense's participation in the drug campaign with the objective of accomplishing three missions. Coordinate Department of Defense support to DLEAs in their respective areas of responsibility, effectively integrate into the counternarcotics C3I network and coordinate with other agencies engaged in counternarcotics detecting and monitoring operations. One of the important things to remember at this point is that FORSCOM with control over JTF-6 is working at the operational level to implement strategic policy created by ONDCP, NSC etc.

JTF-6 is responsible for the Southwest Border. Responsibilities include the coordination of all military assets provided to DLEAs for a two thousand mile border. There are no assigned Department of Defense forces and intelligence is gathered through non-organic sources. The majority of the operations are carried out in a deliberately planned manner.<sup>28</sup>

The Southwest border is approximately 2000 miles long and covers 560,000 square miles. On an average there are 231,000,000 people and 89,000,000 vehicles that cross the border on an annual basis. U.S. Customs uses thirty seconds as a rule for screening vehicles and in those 30 seconds an agent must determine whether or not to pull a vehicle over for further inspection.<sup>29</sup>

The issue of sovereignty is an ongoing problem. Drug traffickers familiar with the laws in neighboring countries, are known to purchase large tracts of land along both sides of the border. While on private property they are afforded protection by laws that require search warrants and court orders before arrests and searches be made.<sup>30</sup>

The interception of drugs in transit by sea and air presents similar issues. Although the aerostats in place along the borders can detect a large number of aircraft, the canyons and mountains of the Southwest Border region preclude 100% detection of flights. This problem is further compounded when one considers that aircraft often take off close to the border and land or drop their cargo into remote sections of the country, often completing their missions before law enforcement officers arrive at the scene. U.S. law addressing the collection of information and surveillance of U.S. citizens also contribute to the difficulty in halting the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. For example, aerial reconnaissance of ground targets from public airspace is allowed with certain restrictions, "but the tracking of suspicious persons or vehicles

to provide their continuing coordinates to LEAs is prohibited."<sup>31</sup>

Operation Alliance is another agency that works within the Southwest Border. Operation Alliance was stood up to filter the requests of various DLEAs prior to JTF-6 receiving the request. Operating under the Southwest Border Committee, Operation Alliance brings together State and local law enforcement agencies, with Federal law enforcement agencies to provide coordinated support along the Southwest Border. Ordinarily Federal DLEAs will submit requests for military assistance directly to Operation Alliance rather than to the Alliance Planning Committee of the state in which they are located. Through officers from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Border Patrol and U.S. Customs Service, Operation Alliance provides liaison officers to JTF-6 for the coordination to DLEAs for Department of Defense support requests.<sup>32</sup>

A problem of parochialism arises from this arrangement. The Director of Operation Alliance is a position that is rotated among three major agencies. The DEA, Border Patrol and U.S. Customs Service. There has been a tendency when the Director of Operation Alliance, who is from one of these three agencies, provides more requests for their particular organizational affiliation, rather than evaluating the mission specifics. This parochialism is fostered by the possibility of the current Operation Alliance Director receiving more money for their agency. There is no easy solution for the problem of parochialism at Operation Alliance. However, if a Director is

appointed who has no affiliation to any Federal agency, decisions might be based on the merits of the DLEA request rather than the organization making the request.

A typical DLEA request can be tracked in the following manner. The request is initially made from the DLEA to Operation Alliance for Department of Defense resources in a counterdrug operation. Operation Alliance then screens the mission for validity and passes the request to JTF-6. JTF-6 then forwards the request to FORSCOM so they can determine whether or not the DLEA request falls within the parameters established by the Department of Justice for legality. The request is then forwarded to CJCS who hands it off to OSD. Once FORSCOM receives approval from JCS they authorize mission approval. JTF-6 then tasks a unit to conduct the mission in support of the DLEA. This process is layered and causes delays that often discourage DLEAs from requesting Department of Defense support.

While on a trip to JTF-6, numerous concerns were expressed by the JTF-6 operations officer. He stated that the bureaucratic process delays the ability of the LEAs to rapidly respond in counterdrug operations. For instance, there was a request by a DLEA in Arizona for the use of Department of Defense resources. Before the approval could be granted, Operation Alliance and FORSCOM were required to approve the request. Operation Alliance approved the request and then forwarded the request to JTF-6 who forwarded the request to FORSCOM. After several days with no response, the operations officer from JTF-6 called his

counterpart at FORSCOM to check on the status of the request. FORSCOM had sent this particular request to JCS as required. When FORSCOM checked with their representatives at JCS, the JCS representative eventually found that the request was still awaiting approval and was in the briefcase of the Secretary of Defense. By the time the request was approved there was no longer a requirement for the mission by the DLEA who had made the initial request a week earlier.<sup>33</sup>

#### U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM)

LANTCOM located in Norfolk, Virginia, has JTF-4 under it's control for the counterdrug campaign. JTF-4, located in Key West Florida, coordinates the surveillance of the air and sea approaches to CONUS. These efforts are primarily focused in the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. JTF-4 assists in establishing counternarcotics communications and intelligence networks which are provided to the DLEAs to help reduce the flow of drugs into CONUS from Latin America.

#### U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)

PACOM, located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii has JTF-5 under it's control for counternarcotics campaign. JTF-5, located in Alameda California, has a similar mission as JTF-4 except that it monitors the flow of drugs inbound to the U.S. from the Far East. JTF-5 also shares USPACOM counternarcotics responsibilities with United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC), a service component of USPACOM. USARPAC is responsible to PACOM for the Department of Defense in support of DLEAs in Alaska, Hawaii and United States



territories and possessions. Both JTF-4 and JTF-5 are unified commands with dedicated Department of Defense forces assigned to them. They both have organic intelligence gathering capabilities with a rapid response capability for antidrug operations.<sup>34</sup>

**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)**

Besides the various JTF's, NORAD is a combined Canadian-United States command contributing in the drug campaign. Norad plans and conducts surveillance missions with airborne and ground radars. They also provide fighter intercepts of potential drug smuggling targets with the added capability of detecting and monitoring any air movement into Central American countries. These capabilities enable NORAD to provide the Central American countries with needed intelligence prior to movement of drugs into the Southwest border by ground transportation.<sup>35</sup> NORAD has identified five key elements for force employment: command, control, monitoring, coordination and scheduling. Four Sector Operations Control Centers accomplish the following:

1. Communicate with the appropriate JTF to provide information on possible traffickers crossing between areas of responsibility.
2. Conduct radar correlation and forward track data from AWACS and other sensors to three locations: NORAD headquarters/NORAD Air Defense Operations Center; Norad Regional Operations Control Center; and the C3I centers.
3. Coordinate the handoff of USAF fighters with the FAA when suspected traffickers move inland.
4. Coordinate with the C3I centers any simultaneous intercepts by USAF fighters and USCG/USCS interceptors.

**5. Provide target information to DLEA interceptors when requested by C3I centers.<sup>36</sup>**

NORAD acts as the Department of Defense mechanism for accomplishing the monitoring and detecting of all air movement within the interior of the United States.

**U.S. Southern Command (SOCOM)**

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) provides the support and development of South and Central American cooperative drug interdiction capabilities. Their mission includes training, operational support, materiel, advice, technological and maintenance support to the law enforcement agencies working within the region. This assistance is geared towards interdicting the flow and drugs leaving the countries while stopping the flow of chemicals needed to process the various drugs.<sup>37</sup>

Current U.S. Southern Command operations in the Andean Region have concentrated in providing resources such as military personnel to act as trainers and advisors. These Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) train the host countries paramilitary and national police forces. Other resources include surveillance and monitoring equipment for intelligence gathering and troop support items such as boots, rations and field equipment. The primary emphasis for combatting drugs within Central and South America region have been in the forms of drug interdiction, crop eradication and intelligence gathering. Even with the amount of resources being provided by the U.S. Southern Command, there

remains the question of whether or not the strategy is effective.

**Political, Economical and Social Dangers Within  
Southern Command Areas of Responsibilities**

In recent statements before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Peter Reuter of the Rand Corporation made the following comments concerning United States efforts in drug interdiction and eradication in the Andean Region. "Source country programs, whether they be crop eradication, crop substitution or refinery destruction, hold negligible prospect for reducing American consumption in the long run. Crop eradication programs may increase the power of guerilla movements by increasing peasant antagonism against the central government; that is of particular importance in Peru."<sup>38</sup> He further stated: "Given our unwillingness to control all border traffic tightly, we must accept that the borders will be vulnerable to the low cost importation of compact drugs such as cocaine and heroin. The solution to the cocaine problem will have to be found largely within the nation's borders."<sup>39</sup>

In similar testimony before the same committee, The Honorable David Jordan; former U.S. Ambassador to Peru and currently Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia made the following comments:

"There are distinct dangers to U.S. military involvement in the region: they inhere in the tight interrelationships in the region among drug producers, traffickers, insurgency movements and terrorist organizations. These interrelationships have confounded local Latin American armed forces, which have been largely frustrated in their efforts to defeat insurgencies sustained by peasant populations whose principal livelihood is protected by the insurgents. Thus, military operations directed at insurgents or terrorists on the one hand, or the coca producers on the other, generally have failed. Yet, operations waged against all of these interwoven elements promise local conflict scenarios evoking strong reminders of Vietnam battlegrounds."<sup>40</sup>

The previous statements, supported by official government data indicate that the United States is not winning the drug war within the Andean Region. The complex economic, political and social environment does not allow for the proper execution of a drug policy.

#### National Guard

There is one more command within the Department of Defense organization that tends to stand alone although a part of the total force package. The National Guard has been major a contributor in the drug campaign long before President Bush devised a National Drug Control Strategy. According to an article in the Navy Times, dated 26 August 1991, the article stated that the National Guard has played the largest role within the Department of Defense in providing assets for the drug campaign.<sup>41</sup> The National Guard is well aware of their role in the drug campaign and seek more responsibility. With more missions assigned to the National Guard comes more power in the form of strengthening their argument for less reduction in the total force concept. In today's reduction of the total force, the

argument that the National Guard plays a larger role in the drug campaign than the active forces, strengthens the Guard position that their numbers should not be reduced. According to representatives at JTF-6, the National Guard volunteers to support the various DLEAs but often over commit. When the planning is complete and the operation is ready to be executed, the National Guard is unable to meet all the commitments initially planned for. This inability to meet the commitments is caused by an over extension of resources. Although their performance has been acceptable, they fail to provide for their missions on a regular bases. Representatives at JTF-6 also confirmed that the DLEAs prefer to work with active duty forces because of reliability.<sup>42</sup>

There can't be fifty-four state Adjutant Generals, all with different interests, involved in the operational activities of the National Guard in the drug campaign.

General Herbert Temple, until recently the commander of the National Guard, has concerns about where the Guard role might take it. He believes the National Guard can help identify new ways that military technology and skills can be brought to bear in the counter-drug effort. "Yet at the same time, I've had to resist some governors who wanted to turn the National Guard into a law enforcement agency, and some people in Washington, D.C. who thought that was a great idea. That smacks of a national police to me, and I don't think America's ready for it."<sup>43</sup>

To keep the governors honest in the utilization of the Guard

for the overall National drug strategy, and not for an increase in the individual States funding is one of General Temple's concerns. Conversely, to protect the National Guard from the individual States Governors desires to expand the Guard drug mission forces General Temple to continually review the evolving role of the Guard in the drug war. General Temple repeats a simple question, "Is this just the nose under the tent? And if so, what comes next?"<sup>44</sup>

### Summary

Having described Department of Defense organization and the missions assigned to the major commands, it is easy to understand why management of resources and capabilities is ineffective. There is no one single command that directs the drug campaign. The responsibilities that the major commands place upon the JTF's to ensure no conflicts arise between the JTF's and DLEAs and no laws are broken, further create problems in effectively fighting drugs.

It is understandable why many of the efforts to fight drugs are duplicative and fragmented. Each major command has its own perspective of how it wants to deploy forces and implement strategy, none of which are similar to their counterparts. In order to provide for better command and control and develop a harmonious relationship with the DLEAs, a form of command and control must be established so that all commands work within the

same parameters. One centralized command within the Department of Defense needs to be established to effectively conduct the drug campaign.

Current missions assigned to each of the JTF's to include SOCOM and NORAD highlight the need for a singular command to effectively fight the drug campaign.

#### **Conclusion and Recommendations on Effectiveness of the Department of Defense Organization**

The ability to effectively win the drug campaign will never be won if the Department of Defense continues to function in its current manner. As long as there are individual JTF's, reporting to separate commands there will never be effective coordination for use of Department of Defense assets. Furthermore, as the Department of Defense's role in counterdrug efforts increases, the inevitable interservice tensions will become more acute as each service competes for expanded roles to justify the maintenance of a strong end strength. This is especially true in counterdrug operations, where military units will be called upon to work side-by-side with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.

The strategy must improve coordination at both the policy and operational levels. Under the Deputy secretary of Defense for Policy a new Assistant Secretary of Defense post for counterdrug missions needs to be formed. This post would provide

the full-time attention and leadership that is needed and would have only one mission, implementation of policy to effectively fight the drug campaign. At the operational level there must be one commander.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is focusing on two missions, Reserve matters and counterdrug policy. Although he has a Director for the drug program who falls under his control, this is not adequate to focus a concentrated effort for the counterdrug campaign. At this level there must be one post with undivided attention directed towards DOD involvement in the counterdrug effort. With undivided attention comes more focus and with more focus comes sound policy. It is unrealistic to think that the Executive agencies outside the DOD will ever set aside individual agency differences and disputes on how to effectively fight the drug campaign. The DOD has the ability to have a coordinated effort if an Assistant Secretary of Defense post for counterdrug efforts is established.

The Pentagon inspector general reported that the Defense Department has divided up the drug detection mission among six "military commands" each of which are responsible for a different geographic area. The result of the intelligence analysis on narco traffickers has been "fragmented, duplicative and not cost effective."<sup>45</sup>

Instead of six different commands with six different ideas of how to effectively utilize resources one command must be established to coordinate the integration of DOD resources with



DLEA requests. A senior integrated national command would ensure the day-to-day activities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and reserve units are coordinated among themselves and with civilian drug enforcement officials from federal, state and local agencies.

I recommend that a unified interagency command be established with directive authority. I also recommend that this command have their own Program Objective Memorandum (POM) which would direct money at a center of gravity for interdiction. One unified commander evaluating the entire drug campaign would develop one clear and concise counterdrug strategy. The results would not answer the question of whether or not the counterdrug strategy is right, but instead allow for everyone working at the tactical level to focus on the same strategy. As the lead agency for detecting and monitoring drugs, the Department of Defense can become the lead agency for establishment of policy for counterdrug operations. Otherwise, the Department of Defense will be no better than the many agencies who talk about the drug campaign, but do little to effectively fight it.

If the United States should lobby to increase the role of the military in drug intervention within the Andean Region, this could prove fatal for the United States as well as the Latin American countries. In a recent article a Drug Enforcement Agent is trekking through the jungle while leading a mission. During the course of the mission the agent is contemplating the absurdity of his leading the mission while a Special Forces team

remains at the base camp. The U.S. Special Forces team have trained the host countries paramilitary personnel but are not allowed to participate in the operation.<sup>46</sup>

There has been a suggestion by the United States to increase the role of the military in counter-narcotics operations. In 1990 a proposal was made to increase the role of U.S. Special Forces in Bolivia. This proposal included the replacement of Drug Enforcement Agents by U.S. Special Forces soldiers during drug missions in the jungle.<sup>47</sup> Current law forbids this type of interaction but the Pentagon now appears to have a newly acquired taste to enter the drug campaign in a more direct approach. The military which was initially drafted into the "War on Drugs" by Congress now shows little reluctance for a mission that resembles a police action instead of an actual war. The driving force behind the Pentagon's decision to increase the role of the military may well be a search for new missions. With the massive reduction in the military budget, the Pentagon is seeking missions that will justify a larger total force structure which equates to more money in the defense budget. A State Department expert stated that Congress pressed a very reluctant military to take on a drug role, and then Glasnost pulls the rug out from under the Pentagon, suddenly the Pentagon is attacking the drug mission with a "can-do" attitude.<sup>48</sup>

The effort to win the drug campaign in this region must have an international and regional cooperation with the respective three Andean civilian governments and they must commit the will

and the means to win the effort. The United States must support this effort by economic assistance, incentives and programs to reduce each country's foreign debt, find or reestablish legitimate cash crops for economic stability and the reduce the trade barriers.

By strengthening and legitimizing the economics of the three Andean countries a basis could be provided for the destabilizing effects of the elimination of cocaine as a major source of income. This strategy can be achieved through a variety of programs such as a balance of payments assistance; alternate employment for peasant farmers and laborers who are involved in drug production, processing or trafficking; economic support and incentives to grow alternate crops; and trade and investment programs to generate jobs, income and foreign exchange. The United States is providing economic assistance for these programs, however, it is conditioned on performance of the country's efforts and successes in combatting the supply problems as well as their respect for human rights.<sup>49</sup>

Additionally, trade barriers effecting Andean licit exports such as flowers, sugar, vegetables, fruit, textiles and coffee are being examined. For example, the reinstatement of the International Coffee Agreement would provide Colombia with \$400-500 million in badly needed revenue. The four participating governments recognizes that economic incentives and assistance are the essential keys to the success of this strategy.<sup>50</sup>

If the United States is serious about winning the drug

campaign the United States government, DLEAs and the Department of Defense must better integrate national capabilities, resources and intelligence gathering. Currently the turf battles that exist between the military services within the Department of Defense in search of a mission, various DLEAs at the policy level and operational level as well as between the U.S. military and DLEAs are causing a piecemeal effort in combatting drugs.

Maneuver warfare dictates that the basis for winning a campaign include decentralized control. With the current organization this tenet is completely ignored. With a central focus of effort, the ability to decentralize will occur. With one command coordinating the efforts of all, and then allowing for execution at the tactical level, there will end up with a more effective integration of DOD resources to DLEAs.

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